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BANKRUPTCY AND HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS
SCOTT F. NORBERG*
INTRODUCTION
The media coverage of higher education is replete these days with reports of
economic challenges faced by higher education institutions, and of colleges and
universities that are struggling financially or failing. Moody's Issues Negative Outlook
for Higher Education,1 Rising Tuition Discounts and Flat Tuition Revenues Squeeze
Colleges Even Harder,2 Historically Black Colleges Face Uncertain Future,3 and
Expect Another Down Year for Tuition Revenue, Moody's Says,4 are exemplary of many
headlines in recent months. While the outlook is not entirely negative, Moody's reports
that one in ten colleges "is suffering 'acute financial distress' because of falling revenues
and weak operating performance."5 Law schools in particular are experiencing historic
declines in enrollment.6
Whatever the fate of financially distressed colleges and universities, one point is
clear: reorganization in bankruptcy is not an option for institutions that receive federal
student financial aid funding from the United States Department of Education ("DOE")
pursuant to title IV of the Higher Education Act.' This is because an institution's
eligibility to participate in title IV programs terminates immediately upon filing for
bankruptcy,8 and termination will instantly destroy the institution's financial viability.
* Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law, Miami, Florida, and Accreditation Project
Director of Data Policy and Collection, American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar. The views expressed in this Article are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
ABA Section of Legal Education. The author is grateful to the participants in the American Bankruptcy Institute
Law Review's symposium for their questions and comments on the author's symposium presentation, especially Ray
Warner and Keith Sharfman. The Article is much improved as a result.
' Don Troop, Moody's Issues Negative Outlook for Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 14, 2014),
http://chronicle.comblogs/bottomline/moodys-issues-negative-outlook-for-higher-education/.
2 Scott Carlson, Rising Tuition Discounts and Flat Tuition Revenues Squeeze Colleges Even Harder, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (July 2, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/Rising-Tuition-Discounts-and/147465.
' Jerome Bailey Jr., Historically Black Colleges Face Uncertain Future, WASH. TIMES (July 22, 2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/22/historically-black-colleges-face-uncertain-future/?page=all.
4 See Expect Another Down Year for Tuition Revenue, Moody's Says, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://chronicle.comblogs/ticker/expect-another-down-year-for-tuition-revenue-moodys-
says/89791?cid-pm&utm source=pm&utm medium=en.
5 Troop, supra note 1.
6 See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
' See 20 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2012). Title IV of the Higher Education Act governs federally funded student
financial aid programs for college and post-secondary vocational training. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a). An institution
must apply to the DOE for eligibility certification that the school meets the standards for participation in the title IV
programs. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 600.20(a)(1)-(2), 668.13(a)(1)-668.16 (2013). To participate in title IV programs, a
school must: (1) be an eligible institution of higher education; and (2) meet program and administrative
requirements. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)-(b), 1002(a)(1)-(6), 1094(a) (providing eligibility requirements for
obtaining funding under title IV).
' See 20 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4)(A),(6) (stating an institution that files for bankruptcy will no longer meet the
definition of a higher education institution and thus, will be ineligible for title IV funding).
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This Article raises the question whether the Higher Education Act ("HEA")
provision that effectively precludes bankruptcy reorganization by colleges and
universities, which was added to the Act in 1992, is wise policy. Even if it was in 1992,
the DOE's regulation of title IV funding and of higher education accreditation has
expanded considerably since then, warranting reconsideration of the anti-bankruptcy
provision in light of these changes. This Article first details the relevant education and
bankruptcy law provisions, and examines the rationale for the HEA anti-bankruptcy
provision as found in the legislative history. The Article then considers the merits of
the provision using a hypothetical case of a stand-alone law school that cannot meet its
debt obligations after paying operating expenses.
I. THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT AND ACCESS TO TITLE IV FINANCIAL AID PROGRAMS
BY INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY
A. Relevant Higher Education Act Provisions
Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 establishes various federal student
financial aid (grant and loan) programs whereby the government pays eligible higher
education institutions funds necessary to provide aid to qualifying students.9 These
programs include: the Federal Pell Grant Program, the Federal Supplemental
Educational Opportunity Grant Program, the Federal Stafford Loan Program, the
Federal PLUS Program, the Federal Consolidation Loan Program, the Federal Work-
Study Program, the Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education
Grant Program, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, and the Federal
Perkins Loan Program. i
Eligible institutions are those that meet the HEA title IV definition of "institution of
higher education."11 The definition imposes three primary requirements for eligibility:
(1) state licensure, (2) accreditation by a DOE-recognized accrediting agency, and (3)
certification by the DOE that the institution is administratively capable and financially
responsible.1 ' The DOE annually evaluates each title IV institution's financial
responsibility using information from the institution's audited financial statement. To
demonstrate that it is financially responsible, an institution must meet all of its financial
obligations, including return of funds for which it is obligated under title IV (for
example, in certain circumstances where a student does not begin attendance or
withdraws, or funds are not disbursed to a student); maintain specified equity, reserve,
and net income ratios; and have sufficient cash reserves to make required returns of
9 See 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a) (hereafter referred to simply as, title IV). If an institution were not eligible to
participate in the title IV student financial aid programs, it would have to finance operations by making its own
loans to students and/or requiring payment of tuition and fees up front. Through participation in title IV programs, a
higher education institution is virtually guaranteed that all tuition and fee charges are paid, up front and on time. If
not for the title IV programs, the institution would need to charge significantly higher tuition to take account of the
costs of underwriting and collecting loans, and of borrower defaults.
'o See 34 C.F.R. § 668.1(c) (2013).
"See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1002.
12 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
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unearned title IV funds.13 The DOE may require an institution that fails the financial
responsibility test to post a letter of credit against potential HEA obligations.
14
The HEA further provides that where a student is unable to complete a program due
to closure of an institution, or if an institution has failed to make a refund of loan
proceeds that the institution owed to a student's lender, the DOE shall repay the
student's loan, with a right against the institution for any refund amount owed to the
student.15 Where a participating institution decides to cease operations or faces possible
loss of state licensure, accreditation, or DOE certification, it must submit a teach-out
plan to its accrediting agency specifying how students will be able to complete their
degree programs notwithstanding closure of the institution. 16 Thus, where an institution
closes and students are unable to complete a program under the institution's teach-out
plan (which may provide for completion of the program at another institution), the
federal government will incur liability for the students' loan obligations.
As amended in 1992, the definition of "institution of higher education" excludes an
"institution .. . that has filed for bankruptcy."1 As a result, any higher education
institution that files for bankruptcy is immediately ineligible for participation in the title
IV financial aid programs. This component of the definition contains no exception or
allowance for discretion. 8
B. Relevant Bankruptcy Code Provisions and Case Law
In 1990, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to provide exceptions to the
automatic stay and to the definition of property of the bankruptcy estate that apply to
higher education institutions. While a higher education institution that participates in
title IV student financial aid programs can be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, 19
13 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.171-668.173 (detailing information an institution must provide and the methodology by
which the Secretary considers it).
14 34 C.F.R. § 668.173(d).
'5 See 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c).
16 See 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(31).
17 20 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(4)(A).
IS See id. The provision may not apply, however, to a higher education institution against which creditors have
filed an involuntary provision. See 11 U.S.C § 303 (2012) (governing filing of involuntary petitions). The statute
refers only to an "institution ... that has filed for bankruptcy" and not to an institution against which a petition has
been filed. There do not appear to be any reported court decisions addressing the question.
'9 Bankruptcy Code section 109, "Who may be a debtor," provides in relevant part:
(b) A person may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title only if such person is not-
(1) a railroad;
(2) a domestic insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan
association, building and loan association, homestead association, a New Markets Venture
Capital company as defined in section 351 of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, a
small business investment company licensed by the Small Business Administration under
section 301 of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, credit union, or industrial bank or
similar institution which is an insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, except that an uninsured State member bank, or a corporation organized under
section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act, which operates, or operates as, a multilateral
clearing organization pursuant to section 409 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 may be a debtor if a petition is filed at the direction of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; or
2015
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property of the estate is defined to exclude a debtor's eligibility to participate in title IV
financial aid programs, as well as a debtor's accreditation status and state licensure.
2 0
Further, the automatic stay provides no relief as against any action by the DOE to
terminate eligibility of a debtor to participate in student financial aid programs, or any
action by an accrediting agency or state regarding the accreditation status or licensure of
a debtor as an educational institution.2 1
Education institution debtors have attempted to escape the operation of these HEA
and Bankruptcy Code limitations on bankruptcy relief in two ways, both of which have
been rejected by courts. In Betty Owen Schools, Inc. v. United States Department of
Education,22 the debtor sought to undo, under Bankruptcy Code section 525, the DOE's
revocation of its right to participate in title IV financial aid programs. 23 The DOE
terminated the debtor's eligibility pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4) (formerly 20
U.S.C. § 1088(a)(4)), which as noted above, provides that an "institution [that] . .. has
filed for bankruptcy" is excluded from the definition of "institution of higher education"
and as such is not eligible to participate in HEA grant and loan programs. 24 The
Department acknowledged that it had terminated the debtor's eligibility to participate in
HEA programs solely because the debtor had filed for bankruptcy.
25
(3)(A) a foreign insurance company, engaged in such business in the United States; or
(B) a foreign bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan association, building
and loan association, or credit union, that has a branch or agency (as defined in section 1 (b)
of the International Banking Act of 1978) in the United States.
(d) Only a railroad, a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title (except a
stockbroker or a commodity broker), and an uninsured State member bank, or a corporation
organized under section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act, which operates, or operates as, a
multilateral clearing organization pursuant to section 409 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 may be a debtor under chapter 11 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 109. Thus, there is no formal bar to an educational institution filing for bankruptcy under chapter 7 or
11.
20 Section 541(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: "Property of the estate does not include- (3) any
eligibility of the debtor to participate in programs authorized under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1001 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), or any accreditation status or State licensure of the debtor as an educational
institution[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3).
21 Section 362(b)(14)-(16) provides:
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or of an application
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, does not operate as a
stay-
(14) under subsection (a) of this section, of any action by an accrediting agency regarding the
accreditation status of the debtor as an educational institution;
(15) under subsection (a) of this section, of any action by a State licensing body regarding
the licensure of the debtor as an educational institution;
(16) under subsection (a) of this section, of any action by a guaranty agency, as defined in
section 4350) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 or the Secretary of Education regarding
the eligibility of the debtor to participate in programs authorized under such Act ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(14)-(16).
22 In re Betty Owen Sch., 195 B.R. 23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
23 See id. at 26-27.
24 See id. at 31.
25 Id. at 31.
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The bankruptcy court initially observed that, "[o]n its face, the Department appears
to have violated section 525 .... ",26 The court held, however, that section 525 did not
invalidate the HEA provision making bankruptcy debtors ineligible to participate in
HEA programs. It reasoned that the general policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code and
the HEA eligibility limitation would be furthered by ruling for the Department; and in
addition, that conflicting provisions within the Bankruptcy Code would be
harmonized.28 Referring to sections 362(b)(14)-(16) and 541(b)(3), the court explained:
If Congress had amended the Bankruptcy Code to allow the
accrediting agencies to take appropriate action free of the protection of
the "automatic stay" and "property of the estate", to hold that the
Department violated section 525 would only inhibit the agency from
taking the very action Congress had, in its wisdom, permitted.29
In Statewide Oilfield Construction, Inc. v. Career Collection Ass 'n,30 the debtor
argued that its relationship with its accrediting agency was an executory contract that
could be assumed, thereby allowing it to cure its defaults and precluding termination.31
The bankruptcy court initially agreed that the relationship was an executory contract,
but reconsidered its decision when shortly thereafter sections 362(b)(14)-(16) and
541(b)(3) became part of the Bankruptcy Code.3 The court reasoned that an assumed
contract is regarded as an asset of the bankruptcy estate, and that Congress had made
clear in section 541(b)(3) that a debtor's accreditation status cannot be an asset of the
estate. The case did not involve an attempt by the debtor to maintain title IV
eligibility.
The Betty Owen Schools and Statewide Oilfield Construction cases appear to have
definitively settled the questions they addressed-it does not appear that there are any
other reported court decisions considering whether section 525 bars termination of
eligibility based on the filing of a bankruptcy petition,34 or whether the accreditation
26 Id.
27 See id. at 34.
28 See id. at 33.
29 See id. The court also reasoned that general bankruptcy policy must yield to more specific policy objectives
and that section 1088(a)(4) of HEA was enacted after section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.; see also New York
Inst. of Dietetics, Inc. v. Riley, 966 F. Supp. 1300, 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that DOE properly terminated
plaintiffs eligibility under title IV based on bankruptcy filing by an entity with which plaintiff was associated,
notwithstanding that section 525(a) prohibits discrimination against "a person that is or has been a debtor under this
title ... or another person with who such debtor has been associated") (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). Cf
Fed. Commc'ns. Comm'n v. NextWave Personal Commc'ns., 537 U.S. 293, 304 (2003) (holding FCC violated
Bankruptcy Code section 525 by cancelling FCC licenses solely for failure to pay debts dischargeable in
bankruptcy; case did not involve any conflict between Bankruptcy Code and another federal statute, the
Communications Act, which did not require revocation as a sanction for failure to make contractual payments for
purchase of licenses).
0 134 B.R. 399 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991).
3' Id. at 401.
32 Id. at 401-02 (considering recent Congressional amendment to Bankruptcy Code).
'3 Id. at 402.
4 See In re Wheeling Coll. of Hair Design, No. 95-68-ST, 1995 WL 934884 (Dep't of Educ. Nov. 22, 1995)
(terminating eligibility to participate in title IV programs where institution had filed for bankruptcy and its
2015
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relationship is an executory contract that could be assumed.
II. THE RATIONALE FOR THE HEA ANTI-BANKRUPTCY PROVISION
As noted above, as part of a comprehensive overhaul of the HEA in 1992, Congress
added section 1002(a)(4), making higher education institutions ineligible for title IV
funding upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.35 The Senate Report accompanying
the HEA amendments3 6 contains no specific explanation of the anti-bankruptcy
provision. Further, although the Report acknowledged the Bankruptcy Code
amendments two years earlier,3 it does not include any consideration of the efficacy or
inefficacy of the amendments in addressing the bankruptcy-related concerns impacting
administration of title IV programs.
More broadly, the Senate Report found that serious flaws in each of the three
primary title IV program eligibility requirements-state licensure,38 accreditation by a
DOE-recognized accrediting agency,3 9 and DOE certification 0 threatened the "cost-
effectiveness and ongoing viability" of the Guaranteed Student Loan Programs
(GSLP).41 In discussing the role and shortcomings of higher education accrediting
agencies in assuring the quality of education required for GSLP participation, the
Report touched briefly on several points concerning bankruptcy and higher education
institutions:
Due process constraints.-Accrediting bodies' ability to respond to
problems in schools has been severely limited by due process
constraints, i.e., actual and/or threatened lawsuits, recourse to
bankruptcy, and mandatory review and appeals procedures in cases
involving adverse actions. [According to the Inspector General,] "By
securing the protection of the [bankruptcy] court, which has an interest
in seeing that the schools survive through reorganization, even a
school that cannot make loan refund payments to former students may
continue to admit new students who in turn incur student loan
obligations [even though that]* * * school may well close or otherwise
cut back its educational program."4 2
Further, the Report found that the DOE's certification process was plagued by
accreditation had been removed).
15 See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448. Section 1002(a)(4) of the
HEA was originally numbered 20 U.S.C. § 1088(a)(4). It was renumbered 20 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4) as part of Pub. L.
No. 105-244 in 1998.36 S. REP. No. 102-58 (1991).
3 Id. at 34.
38 See id. at 14-16.
9 See id. at 16-22.
41 See id. at 25-33.
41 See id. at 1.
42 See id. at 19 (second and third alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
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"pervasive and persistent problems,"43 including its process for certifying institutions
for eligibility to participate in title IV loan programs, and for recognizing accrediting
agencies." As pertaining specifically to bankruptcy and higher education institutions,
the Report found that:
institutions are certified even when there were clear indications of
significant administrative deficiencies .... Moreover, in the case of
surety arrangements, whereby financially weak schools are certified on
the basis of posting cash, bonds, or other assets as a guarantee against
any potential loss, many were plainly inadequate. In one case, a
severely troubled school, whose recertification was based on
increasing its surety bond from $20,000 to $100,000, declared
bankruptcy leaving students with loans worth more than $700,000 and
the Department with about $1 million in cash advances. The
Department failed to collect the $100,000 bond and was unable to go
after the cash advances because the school had no assets.4 5
In its findings, conclusions, and recommendations, the Report concluded:
many of the program's intended beneficiaries-hundreds of thousands
of young people, many of whom come from backgrounds with already
limited opportunities-have suffered further because of their
involvement with the GSLP. Victimized by unscrupulous profiteers
and their fraudulent schools, students have received neither the
training nor the skills they hoped to acquire and, instead, have been
left burdened with debts they cannot repay.
... [W]hile students and taxpayers have paid dearly, unscrupulous
school owners, accrediting bodies, lenders, loan servicers, guaranty
agencies, and secondary market organizations have profited
handsomely, and in some cases, unconscionably.
... [T]he Subcommittee acknowledges that the Congress and the
Department have recently instituted a number of important measures,
including: ...eliminating the bankruptcy recourse used by schools
trying to escape adverse action by accreditation agencies .... 46
In sum, the Senate Report reflects Congressional concerns that bankruptcy courts
had been unduly solicitous of debtors seeking to reorganize, allowing them to continue
41 Id. at 25.
44 See id. at 25-26.
45 Id. at 26.
46 Id. at 33-34.
2015
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to accept students even though the enterprise was failing and ultimately not able to
make loan refund payments and leaving students with student loan debt and without
degrees, and that some institutions were unscrupulous and even fraudulent in their use
of title IV funds. Although the Report acknowledges that the Bankruptcy Code had
been amended to "eliminat[e] the bankruptcy recourse,' 4 it does not explain the
rationale for precluding entirely the possibility of bankruptcy reorganization by higher
education institutions that participate in title IV programs.
III. RECONSIDERING THE HEA ANTI-BANKRUPTCY PROVISION
It is debatable whether the rationale for the anti-bankruptcy provision, as found in
the Senate Report accompanying the HEA amendments in 1992, was sound at the time
the provision was added to the HEA. The Bankruptcy Code amendments made two
years earlier in 1990 exempt DOE actions regarding title IV eligibility from the
automatic stay,48 and further exclude accreditation and licensure status from the
definition of property of the estate and exempt related actions from the operation of the
automatic stay.49 Thus, apart from the bankruptcy exclusion in HEA section 1002(a)(4),
the DOE, state licensing authorities, and accrediting agencies may enforce eligibility,
licensing and accreditation standards without creditor or bankruptcy court interference.
If the DOE has not terminated an institution's eligibility for title IV funding at the point
that it files for bankruptcy relief, there may be grounds (apart from the anti-bankruptcy
provision) to terminate eligibility after the filing. If the institution does not meet DOE
financial responsibility requirements, its eligibility will be subject to termination
without bankruptcy court or creditor interference.
Further, the rationale that unscrupulous or fraudulent institutions found refuge in
bankruptcy to the detriment of the DOE and students is misplaced. To the contrary,
bankruptcy entails court supervision that guards against fraud and mismanagement, and
allows for recovery against owners and others for fraudulent conveyances and
preferences. Likewise, the concern that bankruptcy permitted bankrupt higher
education institutions to avoid loan refund and security bond obligations is misplaced.
These problems arise from the lack of adequate DOE oversight and insufficient debtor
assets, not from the act of filing for bankruptcy. Finally, the critique that bankruptcy
courts were overly solicitous of debtors seeking to reorganize is moot in light of the
absolute exclusion found in section 362(b)(16) relating to DOE actions to enforce its
regulations concerning eligibility for title IV funding.50
Alternatively, perhaps the rationale for the anti-bankruptcy provision is more
simply that, any institution needing to declare bankruptcy is too risky to bet taxpayer
dollars on it, and too risky to allow students to enroll in. As discussed above, however,
41 Id. at 34.
48 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(16) (2012).
41 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(b)(3), 362(b)(14)-(16); see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508, § 3007, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-28 (amending sections 362(b) and 541(b), modifying definition of
"property of the estate" to exclude eligibility of debtor to participate in programs authorized under Higher
Education Act).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(16).
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the counter argument is that filing for bankruptcy does not change the underlying
financial condition of the institution, and the Bankruptcy Code exceptions to the
automatic stay and property of the estate provisions permit the DOE, accrediting
agencies, and state licensing agencies to proceed to enforce their rights outside the
purview of the bankruptcy court.
Even if sound at the time, expansion of DOE oversight of its institution certification
and accreditation agency recognition processes since 1992 are reason to reconsider the
merits of the per se exclusion. Part IV below uses legal education and a hypothetical
law school as the context for considering the merits of the exclusion. This discussion
posits that the Bankruptcy Code provisions providing special exemptions from the
automatic stay and property of the estate remain in place. In addition, it is suggested
that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to grant priority to DOE claims over general
unsecured claims.
IV. THE HEA ANTI-BANKRUPTCY PROVISION RECONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF A
LAW SCHOOL IN THE CURRENT LEGAL EDUCATION MARKET AND DOE REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT
A. The Decline of the Legal Education Market
While higher education institutions in general currently face significant economic
challenges, 1  legal education in particular is experiencing historic declines in
enrollment. The percentage of law graduates who obtained legal employment within
nine months of graduation has been declining since at least 2001, and this decline was
significantly aggravated with onset of the Great Recession in 2008.52 While the legal
employment rate for law graduates ticked up slightly for the graduating class of 2013,
still only 70.6% of the graduates had obtained full-time legal employment within nine
months of graduation, with 57% of the class in full-time bar pass required positions and
13.6% in full-time J.D. advantage jobs nine months after graduation. 53
The continuing low legal employment rates for law graduates have led to a
correction in law school enrollments, which have declined sharply over the past four
years. The number of first-year matriculates reached an all-time high in fall 2010, and
since then has fallen to a level not seen since the late 1970s (when there were fewer
than 170 ABA-approved law schools, compared to 205 today).54
5' See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
52 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 116-17 (2012) (explaining percentage of graduates who
obtained jobs as lawyers declined from 68.3% in 2001 to 62.5% in 2009 and discussing law schools' response).
51 See 2013 Law Graduate Employment Data, AM. B. ASS'N SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO B. 1 (2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal education and admissions to the bar/statistics
/2013 law graduate employment data.authcheckdam.pdf.
51 See Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963-2012, AM. B. ASS'N SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO B. 1
(2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dan/aba/administrative/legal education and admissions to the bar
/statistics/enrollment degrees awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (providing data for number of first year students enrolled
in law schools from 1964-2012).
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First-Year Enrollments at ABA-Approved Law Schools, 2010-201411
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Moreover, the short-term forecast for law school enrollments remains negative.
Law School Admission Council test administrations were down by 9.1% on the June
2014 test, and by 8.1% on the September/October 2014 test.f7
With declining law school enrollments has come a decrease in the qualifications of
entering classes as reflected in 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile LSAT scores. The
average LSAT score of the entering classes at ABA-approved law schools fell by about
two points at each of the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles from 2010 to 2013.58
Average 25/50/75th Percentile LSAT Scores at ABA-Approved Law Schools, 2010
and 2013
Year 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile
2010 155.2 158.1 160.5
2013 152.2 156.0 158.6
55 See id.; see also ABA Section of Legal Education Reports 2014 Law School Enrollment Data, ABA NEWS
ARCHIVES (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2014/12/aba section of legal.html; ABA Section of Legal Education Reports 2013 Law School
Enrollment Data, ABA NEWS ARCHIVES (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2013/12/aba section of legal.html.
56 See id.; see also ABA Section of Legal Education Reports 2014 Law School Enrollment Data, supra note 55;
ABA Section of Legal Education Reports 2013 Law School Enrollment Data, supra note 55.
51 See LSATs Administered Counts and Percent Increases by Admin and Year, LSAC (2014),
http://lsac.org/Isacresources/data/lsats-administered.
58 See Jerry Organ, Thoughts on Fall 2013 Enrollment and Profile Data Among Law Schools, LEGAL
WHITEBOARD (March 2, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2014/03/thoughts-on-fall-2013-
enrollment-and-profile-data-among-law-schools.html (noting decline in first year LSAT scores between 2010 to
2013).
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At forty schools, the median LSAT score fell by four or more points between 2010 and
2013. 59
At the same time, bar examination passage rates have declined.60 The mean scaled
Multistate Bar Examination score on the July 2014 bar examination was more than two
points lower than the previous year, marking the single largest drop in the mean score in
a generation.61 The National Conference of Bar Examiners has attributed the decline to
the weaker entering class credentials of the class that entered in 2011 and graduated in
2014.62
B. Expanded Oversight by the DOE of Accrediting Agencies and in the Certification of
Institutions for Title IV Eligibility
Since 1992, the DOE has added significant oversight in both its process for
recognizing accreditation agencies and its process for certifying institutions for title IV
eligibility. Indeed, the prevailing criticism today of the DOE's management of the
recognition of higher education accrediting agencies is that it is overly regulatory.63
Several examples drawn from the Accreditation Project of the American Bar
Association Section of Legal Education, whose Council and Accreditation Committee
are recognized by the DOE as the accrediting agency for the J.D. degree, may illustrate
the point. As now required by DOE regulations, 64 while ABA-accredited law schools
receive a site visit and top-to-bottom accreditation review every seven years, 65 Rule 6 of
the ABA Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools now provides for annual
interim monitoring of schools based on financial resources, employment outcomes, bar
passage rates, and admissions requirements and enrollment changes. 66 Further, where
" See id. (discussing number of schools experiencing LSAT score declines at each percentile).
60 See Tamara Tabo, When Bar Scores Plummet, Who Will Examine The Examiners?, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 7,
2014, 6:01 PM), http://abovethelaw.con/20i4/i i/when -bar-scores-plummet-who-will-examine-the-examiners/
(discussing drop in scores for July 2014 bar exam).
61 See id. (reporting national average MBE score lowest in ten years and July 2014 MBE pass rates experienced
largest decline since MBE was implemented).62See id. (citing Erica Moeser's address to law school deans regarding multi-state bar exam scoring).
63 See Eric Kelderman, Public-College Leaders Rail Against Education Dept.'s 'Regulatory Culture', CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/Public-College-Leaders-
Rail/149535/?cid=pm&utm source=pm&utm medium=en (citing Thomas Edison State College president, George
A. Pruitt, who stated Department of Education's "regulatory culture" impedes innovation and progress in higher
education).
64 See 34 C.F.R. § 602.19 (2013) (providing for monitoring and reevaluating of institutions or programs).
65 See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS R. 5(b)(1)(2014-2015),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/niisc/legal education/
Standards/2014 2015 corrected aba rules of procedure.authcheckdam.pdf (stating site evaluation of accredited
law school shall be conducted "in the third year following the granting of full approval and very seventh year
thereafter").
66 See id. at R. 6. Rule 6 provides in full:
Rule 6: Interim Monitoring of Accreditation Status
(a) The Accreditation Committee shall monitor the accreditation status of law schools on an
interim basis between site evaluations. In its interim monitoring of a law school's
accreditation status, the Committee shall use a law school's annual questionnaire
submissions, other information requested by the Committee, and information otherwise
deemed reliable by the Committee for its review.
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there is a finding of possible non-compliance with any standard, it generally must be
resolved by the Accreditation Committee and Council within two years or the school's
accreditation is terminated.6 v
The efficacy of accreditation to ensure the quality of accredited programs should
not be overstated. Indeed, there are salient critiques that agencies such as the ABA
have been "captured" by the schools it is charged with regulating, and that the Standards
are not sufficiently rigorous.68 Under pressure from the DOE to establish an output-
based standard for accreditation, the ABA adopted a bar pass standard in 2005 that
arguably is set very low. No school has failed it, although it is fair to posit that schools
that may be in danger of violating the standard have made the program improvements
necessary to comply.6 9 Perversely, the bar pass standard arguably eclipses other
standards on quality of educational program and governing admission of students with
weak performance predictors. As long as the school is meeting the minimum bar pass
standard, the thinking goes, it is necessarily in compliance with minimum standards on
quality of faculty, academic program, admissions, and so on. The larger point,
however, is that the accreditation process now required by the DOE is significantly
more rigorous than it was when Congress overhauled the HEA in 1992.
C. A Hypothetical Case for Bankruptcy Reorganization
Consider ABC School of Law, a hypothetical independent law school that is
accredited by the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar. It is a lower-ranked law school in a desirable geographic
location. It is tuition-dependent, relying on student tuition dollars for over 90% of its
operating budget. Students borrow the vast majority of their tuition and living expenses
through title IV programs. The school grants scholarships ranging from 25% to 100%
of tuition to about 65% of the student body. These scholarships come very largely from
tuition paid by other students. The school has a modest endowment of nearly $40
million, most of it restricted to professorships and student scholarships. It employs
approximately 150 faculty and staff, and is a party to hundreds of contracts for goods
and services, some short-term and some longer-term, ranging from library resources to
(b) In conducting interim monitoring of law schools, the Committee shall consider at a
minimum:
(1) Resources available to the law school;
(2) Efforts and effectiveness in facilitating student career placement;
(3) Bar passage; and
(4) Student admissions including student credentials, size of enrollment, and
academic attrition.
67 See id. at R. 14(b) ("The period of time by which a law school is required to demonstrate compliance with a
Standard shall not exceed two years from the date of determination of noncompliance .... ). This rule is required
by DOE regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 602.20(a)(2)(iii).
68 See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 52, at 11 (describing 1995 lawsuit filed against ABA regarding accreditation
process).
69 See David Yellen, The Dean's Office: Why The ABA Is Resistant To Change, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 7, 2013,
10:11 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/03/the-deans-office-why-the-aba-is-resistant-to-change/ (noting weak bar
passage standard and suggesting it should be strengthened).
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copier machines to catering. The school is among the fifteen largest enterprises in
terms of its contribution to the local economy.
During the steady law school enrollment increases of 2000-2010, the school
expanded its enrollments and built a new, larger, and very expensive state-of-the-art
facility that it financed with borrowed funds. Not long after the school occupied the
new facility, legal education was hit by the continuing significant declines in
enrollment. Tracking national trends, ABC's first-year enrollments have declined by
over 25% since 2010. Further, as is the case at many lower-ranked law schools, ABC
has seen increasing numbers of students transfer to other, more highly ranked schools.
With the decline in enrollments, ABC has also seen a sizable drop in the credentials of
its entering classes over the past four years as measured by LSAT score and UGPA. In
other words, even as it has had to reduce the size of its first-year classes, the school has
lost ground in the credentials of its entering classes. Had it maintained entering class
credentials at 2010 levels, it would have experienced even larger declines in enrollment.
ABC School of Law Enrollments and Entering Class Credentials, 2010-2014
Year IL Enrollment Total Enrollment Median LSAT Median UGPA
Score
2010 500 1200 152 3.12
2011 420 1100 151 3.01
2012 390 1050 148 2.93
2013 320 910 145 2.92
2014 250 750 142 2.88
The school has trimmed its faculty, staff, library, travel, and other expenses in light
of the reduced enrollments (although under the watchful eye of the ABA, it has added
resources to its academic support program in order to prepare the larger numbers of
students with weaker admissions profiles). The continuing faculty and staff members
have agreed to 20% pay cuts. Even so, while revenues significantly exceed expenses,
ABC cannot meet its debt service payments on the new building. It is in default on its
mortgage, and has been in negotiations with the lender for several months. The
building was designed as a law school, and so will not have much of a market for resale
if the mortgagee were to foreclose on it.
The ABA has been carefully monitoring the law school's compliance with
accreditation standards, including the requirement that the school have adequate
financial resources to meet present and anticipated program needs .7 The lower
enrollments, reduced financial resources, and weaker credentials of the entering classes
have been the subject of close and continuing interim accreditation monitoring. Bar
passage rates continue to meet accreditation standards. Likewise, the DOE is
monitoring the school for compliance with DOE financial and administrative
regulations. Although the school is in default on its mortgage, the DOE has not
" See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS Standard 201 (2014-2015),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nisc/legal education
/Standards/2014 2015 aba standards chapter2.authcheckdam.pdf.
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decertified the school's eligibility for title IV funding as the school negotiates a possible
restructuring of the mortgage debt. Both the ABA and the DOE have followed closely
the progress of the negotiations between ABC and the mortgagee.
This hypothetical scenario is not implausible, and ABC School of Law presents a
strong profile for chapter 11 reorganization. Like any other overleveraged business that
generates income in excess of operating expenses, and going concern value exceeds
liquidation value, there are strong incentives for creditors to consensually restructure the
debt. However, collective action problems or dysfunction in debtor-creditor
negotiations may derail a consensual restructuring. Bankruptcy would provide an
opportunity for the school to restructure its debt, preserve going concern value for the
benefit of creditors, maintain employment of faculty and staff, continue relationships
with suppliers, and help to preserve the local tax base. The threat of bankruptcy
provides added incentive for creditors, the mortgagee in particular, to restructure the
school's debt.
Under current law, bankruptcy of course is not an option for ABC School of Law
(or any other higher education institution that participates to any significant extent in
title IV student financial aid programs). What interest is advanced by the rule? And do
the benefits outweigh the costs in terms of successful reorganizations that are precluded
by the rule? Arguably, the HEA anti-bankruptcy provision gives the DOE a measure of
control over a financially distressed institution that it would not otherwise have.
Without bankruptcy court interference, the DOE may have enhanced leverage to
demand that an institution meet DOE financial and administrative requirements to
remain eligible for title IV funding. The recent case involving a for-profit educational
institution, Corinthian, may be an example. There, the DOE appointed a monitor to
oversee the winding down of the business.1
But this leverage very largely exists apart from the HEA anti-bankruptcy provision.
Bankruptcy Code section 362(b)(16) provides that the automatic stay does not apply to
any action by the DOE regarding a debtor's eligibility to participate in title IV programs
for failure to meet administrative capability or financial responsibility requirements.72
This exception provides nearly the same leverage as the anti-bankruptcy provision
without precluding a bankruptcy filing to deal with creditors other than the DOE .71 In
other words, the provision barring eligibility of an institution that files for bankruptcy
adds very little to the Code exemption, while altogether precluding a college or
university from using bankruptcy to address other debt problems. To further protect
title IV programs from loss, the Code could be amended to grant a priority for loan
refund obligations over general unsecured debts.
Instead, the anti-bankruptcy provision may give undue leverage to creditors other
than the DOE. In the hypothetical case of ABC School of Law, the mortgage holder
"' Katy Murphy, Corruption-buster to Monitor Sale, Closure of Corinthian Colleges, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS
(July 18, 2014, 10:21 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/education/ci 26173323/corinthian-colleges-former-u-s-
attorney-patrick-fitzgerald; Richard Perez-Pena, College Group Run for Profit Looks to Close or Sell Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 4, 2014, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.comi/2014/O7/O5/education/corinthian-colleges-to-
largely-shut-down.html (reporting on Corinthian College's agreement with federal Education Department).
72 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(16) (2012).
73 Id.
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and other creditors are in a position to demand changes in the school's operating plan
that may be inconsistent with program quality standards. Creditors are less likely than
the DOE, the school's accrediting agency, and the school itself to appreciate these
requirements. In the hypothetical case, to maintain revenues, the school has
significantly lowered admissions criteria, and in order to reduce expenses, has reduced
faculty and staff, thereby increasing the student-faculty ratio and eroding the quality of
student services. The HEA anti-bankruptcy provision may deprive the debtor of some
leverage it may have to hold the line on program quality standards, while enhancing the
mortgagee's leverage to improve the bottom line at the likely expense of program
quality. The bankruptcy court as a neutral tribunal would be in a position to impartially
consider a debtor higher education institution's business plan in light of the competing
interests of creditors, on the one hand, and the debtor's interest in maintaining
educational program quality, on the other hand. In effect, the DOE and accrediting
agencies are allies of an institution that meets program quality standards but is
overleveraged with debt.
V. CONCLUSION: WHY NOT BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
INSTITUTIONS?
Why should a higher education institution not have access to bankruptcy
reorganization as any other enterprise? The same policies that underlie the
reorganization of businesses in general also support reorganization for higher education
institutions. Chapter 11 enables preservation of the going concern value of an
enterprise and thereby the maximization of recoveries for creditors."4 In addition, it
enables the resolution of creditor versus creditor disputes over entitlements to the
debtor's assets; establishes certain preferences in the distribution of value to creditors;
and makes possible the preservation of jobs, local tax bases, and supplier
relationships. 75
In the hypothetical case of ABC School of Law, the institution continues to be
accredited by the ABA and certified by DOE to participate in title IV programs. The
filing of a chapter 11 petition would not in and of itself change these facts, and may
allow the school to bring about a restructuring of its mortgage debt that would not
otherwise be possible outside of bankruptcy. If the school and mortgagee cannot come
to terms, and the school is forced to liquidate, the going concern surplus value of the
enterprise may be lost to creditors, the community would lose an important economic
asset, and the employment of numerous faculty and staff members would be disrupted.
"4 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv.
97, 109 (1984) (suggesting in bankruptcy a firm should be kept "intact only if it has more value as a going concern
than liquidated, because only then will the assets be put to their highest-valued use").
"5 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 785-88 (1987) (highlighting positive
outcomes of bankruptcy on debtors, creditors, and other interested parties).
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